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Abstract
The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) is taken to show that values are inevitably involved in making judgements or forming beliefs. After
reviewing this conclusion, I pose cases which are prima facie counterexamples: the unreflective application of conventions, use of black-boxed
instruments, reliance on opaque algorithms, and unskilled observation reports. These cases are counterexamples to the AIR posed in ethical terms
as a matter of personal values. Nevertheless, it need not be understood
in those terms. The values which load a theory choice may be those of
institutions or past actors. This means that the challenge of responsibly
handling inductive risk is not merely an ethical issue, but is also social,
political, and historical.
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Introduction

The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) is a standard move to show the connection between values and scientific belief formation. As I explain in section 2:
Although the argument is sometimes formulated in narrow terms, it points to
a tension between pursuing true beliefs and avoiding false ones that is present
any time someone forms a belief. Numerous examples show how this plays
out in scientific contexts— from theory choice, to model building, to reporting observation— and the generality of the argument seems to show that this
entanglement of science and values holds for the formation of every belief.
As I argue in section 3, however, there are situations in which it is implausible
to say that the formation of the belief reflects a value judgment— cases in which
a belief is formed unreflectively, either by immediate perception or habitually
∗ Earlier versions of this paper were given as talks at the University of Texas, Dallas and at
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Thanks to helpful feedback from those audiences, especially
Clair Morrissey, Per Wikman-Svahn, and John Milanese. Thanks also to Jon Mandle and
Ariel Zylberman.
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following a conventional procedure. Even though forming the belief will have
consequences which might be good or bad, in such cases it seems wrong to say
that forming the belief reflects the scientist’s values.
This poses a puzzle: General considerations of risk suggest that every belief
adoption reflects scientist’s values, but there are some specific cases where that
does not seem to hold.
In section 4, I offer a response to this puzzle which highlights the possibility
that the trade-off made in belief formation might reflect not the values of the
individual forming the belief but instead the values of their community or the
values of past actors. This means that the challenge of responsibly handling
inductive risk is not merely an ethical issue but is also social, political, and
historical.
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Inductive risk

The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) is perhaps the most used tool for
establishing a legitimate place for values in scientific theorizing.
The issue is readily seen with statistical inference. Take a schematic example:
You have some data, and you want to decide whether the data supports some
hypothesis. Given rates of cancer in an experimental group exposed to such-andso chemical and rates in a control group, does the chemical cause cancer? One
rate is higher than the other. You calculate the level of statistical significance,
for example as a p-value. Risk enters when considering what p-value is required
in order for the result to be taken as supporting a link between the chemical
and cancer. A looser threshold will license many conclusions that turn out to be
false— so-called false positives. A stricter threshold will block many conclusions
that turn out to be true— false negatives. Setting a p-value threshold weighs
the cost of false positives against the cost of false negatives.
It is harder to formulate the general issue, because both words in the phrase
‘inductive risk’ are potentially misleading.
Philosophers use the word ‘induction’ equivocally: sometimes narrowly to
mean projective inference from a sample to a population and sometimes broadly
to mean non-deductive, ampliative inference. The same ambiguity applies to
‘inductive risk’, which might apply only to induction in a narrow sense. Rudner (Rudner 1953) explicitly holds that scientific inference is statistical. More
recently, Andreasen and Doty write that “Inductive risk can be broadly characterized as the risk of erroneously accepting (or rejecting) a hypothesis due to
the probabilisitic nature of most hypothesis testing” (Andreasen and Doty 2017,
p. 128).1 There is risk of error in all scientific inference, though, so the issue is
not merely about interpreting statistical data.
We could highlight this broader issue by speaking instead of ‘ampliative
risk’, but both induction and ampliative inference are inference. So inductive
or ampliative risk so-called does not apply to observation, even though there
1. See also ChoGlueck (ChoGlueck 2018) and the exchange between MacGillivray
(MacGillivray 2019) and Hicks et al. (Hicks, Magnus, and Wright 2019).

2

are also risks of error involved in making observation reports which parallel the
risks identified by the AIR.2
The word ‘risk’ suggests that it is just the danger of things going wrong—
drawing false conclusions— that is at issue. Ted Richards writes that “one is
no longer employing the AIR if one factors the consequences of drawing correct
conclusions into one’s decision making” (Elliott and Richards 2017b, p. 265,
fn. 1). Regardless of how we characterize the AIR, however, the potential danger
of forming a false belief must be balanced against the potential benefit of forming
a true one. The latter value should figure in settling belief just as much as the
former.
Rather than whinge about what the AIR is exactly, let’s consider a general
feature of our epistemic situation. Magnus (Magnus 2013, 2014, 2018) calls
this the James-Rudner-Douglas (JRD) thesis: Anytime a scientist announces a
judgement of fact, they are making a trade-off between wanting to believe true
things and wanting not to believe false things. These are both epistemic motives,
so they are not some intrusion from the outside. However, epistemology itself
cannot tell us how to weigh one against the other. Scientific judgement involves
assessing costs and benefits.3
There are no universal values that can be filled in here, just as there is
no absolute, rational rule for balancing enthusiasm against scepticism. Our
enthusiasms and cautions are not topic-neutral. There are matters which we
care about, where the prospect of possibly believing the truth matters to us.
There are others about which we are more or less indifferent.
The JRD thesis is supported by considerations like the AIR, even if the
AIR itself is narrower or somewhat different. Note that the thesis— although
it applies to every judgement— does not allow space for every value. Instead,
it just makes space for specific conditional values. With respect to a specific
claim P, these values are
• the value of believing P if P were true,
• the cost of believing P if P were false,
• the cost of not believing P if P were true, and
• the value of not believing P if P were false.
This restriction to specific values reflects the distinction Heather Douglas
(Douglas 2009) makes between two different roles that values can play. Values
play a direct role if a scientist considers unconditionally whether it would be
good or bad if P were the case; e.g. if she believes P because things would be
better if P were true. The JRD thesis does not make space for that general
consideration to play a role in theory choice. Values play an indirect role if they
“act to weight the uncertainty about the claim, helping to decide what should
2. See Magnus (Magnus 2018, p. 418).
3. The thesis is named for William James, Richard Rudner, and Heather Douglas— three
prominent exponents of it.

3

count as sufficient evidence for the claim” (Douglas 2009, p. 96). Values should
not play a direct role in deciding what to believe, but they not only may but
must play an indirect role.
This distinction is important, but describing it in terms of different roles is
somewhat misleading. The values which play an indirect or direct role are not
merely the same values doing different jobs. Rather, they are different values.
The values which necessarily play a role in any belief are the costs/benefits of
believing P (or not) conditional on P being true (or false). The values which
are epistemically irrelevant are the costs/benefits of P being true (or false).4
Adopting any belief is subject to the JRD thesis, so values are always in
play.
The conclusion of the AIR is often formulated in ethical terms. That is,
a scientist is responsible for how they form their beliefs. When the costs or
benefits are large, they ought to consider the value trade-offs explicitly. Failure
to do so is both an epistemic and ethical failure. It is natural, then, to see the
values in play as the values that the scientist themself either does or ought to
have.
This personal reading of the values is reinforced by considering specific examples like the discovery that peptic ulcer disease (PUD) is caused by bacteria.
In the early 1980s, it was believed that PUD was caused by excess stomach acid.
Barry Marshall and his collaborators found a correlation between the presence
of the bacteria Helicobacter pylori (H. pylori ) and PUD. However, it was unclear whether the bacteria caused the ulcers or was merely present because the
stomach was already compromised. Animal evidence did not show an effect.
Marshall decided that further experiment was required, so he ingested a vial
of H. pylori. He got sick, and his illness along with biopsies proved that H.
pylori could cause illness in an otherwise healthy person. Further research reinforced the connection, and Marshall won the 2005 Nobel Prize in Physiology
or Medicine (along with his collaborator Robin Warren).
Matters before Marshall’s self-experiment were equivocal. The evidence
could be interpreted to favor Marshall’s belief, but it allowed an alternative
interpretation. He saw connections with earlier work and other unexplained
findings, but other scientists were unconvinced. Marshall drew different conclusions than his colleagues at least in part because of their different stakes.
Marshall’s research funding was nearing its end. Absent a breakthrough, he
would have had to pursue a job in private practice. Alternately, Marshall later
wrote, “a successful infection with Helicobacter would point towards a career in
clinical research, more exciting but likely to be financially insecure” (Marshall
2006, p. 269). The JRD thesis, read as a matter of personal ethics, allows us to
see both Marshall and his more conservative colleagues as responsible. Marshall
weighed the possibility of getting it right more heavily than the risk of getting it
wrong, and his personal stakes led him to see more promise in the claim linking
4. Note that there is no fixed way to calculate one set of values from the other. For example:
It would be good for me to believe I have cancer if it is true that I do, but bad for me to have
cancer— yet it it would be good for me to believe I have a winning lottery ticket if I do, and
also good for me to have it.
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H. pylori to PUD than his colleagues saw.5
To sum up: The JRD thesis is a general consideration and seems to hold for
every claim, every belief.
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Problem cases

In this section, I pose four kinds of cases in which someone forms a belief that
does not reflect their values. Further examples of each kind are easy enough to
devise.
1. Unreflective application of conventions: Consider a discipline which
takes a result with a p-value of less than .05 to be statistically significant. Many
scientists understand what this means and so, at least implicitly, are on-board
for the trade-offs that this involves. Yet a student or someone peripherally
involved in research who is trained in the practice may not understand it at
that level. The statistical test is just a method that they apply in the way that
they were taught to apply it. Because they do not know about the trade-offs
involved in the threshold, it seems wrong to see those trade-offs as reflecting
their values.
2. Black-boxed instruments: It is a familiar fact from the sociology of
scientific knowledge that instruments become black-boxed over time. For example, there was a time when radiation was an unfamiliar phenomenon. Scientists
built their own geiger counters and were concerned with how and where geiger
counters could be used as reliable instruments. For a physicist today, however,
geiger counters are a standard commodity which is ordered from a catalog. Although there is skill involved in using one, the scientist need not know what
every part in the geiger counter does. They need not be in a position to reflect
on the trade-offs involved in building it this way rather than some other way—
if they are not, then they are in no position to measure the trade-offs by the
standard of their own values.
3. Reliance on opaque algorithms: People increasingly rely on the output
of software to inform their decisions. In some cases, the algorithm is proprietary
and the end user has no access to the details of how it works. Even if such details
are available, the end user may not have sufficient understanding of them to
reckon with possible errors in the output.
The output of the algorithm can be biased without any bias appearing in
the code of the program itself. A pattern-recognition algorithm can learn and
so replicate biases present in its data set. For example, a network trained on
pictures in which two-thirds of the people cooking are women learns to strongly
associate cooking with women (Zhao et al. 2017). As Barocas and Selbst observe, algorithms “can reproduce existing patterns of discrimination, inherit the
5. My use of this example follows the discussion in Magnus (Magnus, forthcoming).
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prejudice of prior decision makers, or simply reflect the widespread biases that
persist in society. . . . Because the discrimination at issue is unintentional, even
honest attempts to certify the absence of prejudice on the part of those involved. . . may wrongly confer the imprimatur of impartiality on the resulting
decisions” (Barocas and Selbst 2016, p. 674).
Moreover, an actual case can fall short of “honest attempts to certify the
absence of prejudice.” Imagine an engineer on a deadline just making something
that will ship and a marketing department which nevertheless assures the end
user that the algorithm is not biased. The inner workings of the system are a
trade secret, so the end user will be in no position to tell what risks they face
when forming beliefs based on the software. So the risks do not reflect the end
user’s values. Moreover, since the risks are the result of corners cut at the last
minute, the risks need not reflect the values of the engineers or the software
company either.
Some cases exhibit all three of the features that I have mentioned so far.
Consider a technician in a hospital lab who prepares blood pathology results
using an array of devices, reagents, and practices. They aim to follow the
standard practices, and we might even suppose that they will produce more-orless the same report as any other competent technician. The technician may
have no understanding of the underlying systematic trade-offs of the systems
which they are implementing, and it does not necessarily make the lab a better
one if they do. So the judgments need not reflect the technician’s values.
4. Unskilled observation reports: Consider an ordinary perceptual situation. As a first example, suppose a philosopher looks at a lamp to see if the light
is turned on and sees that it is. He does not consider the possibility that the
sun might just be glinting through the window and striking the lampshade in a
way that makes it look as if the light is on. It does not even occur to him, so he
does not reflect on the possible costs of error. He could consider the conditional
values involved, if he stopped and asked about them, but he does not.
Justin Biddle and Rebecca Kukla argue that values are incorporated into
“implicit phronetic practices”, the tacit knowledge involved in observation. They
write, “vision already encodes a balancing of values” and “values are built into. . .
perceptual episodes” (Biddle and Kukla 2017, p. 221). This seems plausible in
the case of the philosopher looking at the lamp. He could reckon with the values
involved in the perceptual judgement but does not. Allowing a glance to suffice
reflects at least an implicit judgement that the stakes are low.
However, there are other cases of forming perceptual judgements where the
risks could not be made reflectively available. Suppose a different philosopher
is working with biologists in the rain forest, surveying areas, and reporting the
presence or absence of a particular kind of grasshopper. She lacks experience
and so may miss grasshoppers or misidentify them, even if she is as attentive as
she can be. She lacks the expertise to even estimate what her error rates or the
significance of her errors are likely to be.6
6. This example is adapted from Clair Morrissey’s description of her own experience.
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The second philosopher could not reckon with the values involved because
she lacks the relevant expertise to do so. Her degree of certainty should be
proportional to her reliability— but, although she knows she is substantially
less reliable than the biologists she is working with, she is unable to assess
how unreliable she is. She lacks enough experience to coordinate her degree
of confidence to her reliability, so it is implausible to think of the perceptual
episode as encoding or incorporating her values.
To sum up: Several classes of claim or belief seem like counterexamples in
which the JRD thesis does not hold.
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A puzzle and some resolutions

The two preceding sections suggest on the one had that the JRD thesis is entirely
general and holds in every case (section 2) but also that it does not hold in
certain counter-example cases (section 3). This is a puzzle.
One possible response would be to hold the JRD thesis as a moral demand
rather than as a description. One could then see each alleged counterexample
as a case in which someone falls short. The idea is that agents always ought to
explicitly consider the risks of forming a belief, but that they do not always do
so.
When the philosopher in the former example looks at a lamp and believes
that it is on without considering costs and benefits, this reply holds that he has
done wrong. However, such a norm seems to require too much of him. If he
were to consider costs and benefits explicitly, then he would have to form beliefs
about conditional values. In order to do that, he would need to consider the
costs and benefits of those beliefs. And so on— the obligation would require an
infinite regress of judgements.
The philosopher could not possibly reckon with the costs and benefits associated with all of the beliefs in that infinite regress. More than that, he would
probably not be more responsible by following that regress out as far as he
could. Suppose that he sees that the light is on and that nothing much hangs
on whether he is right or wrong about it. It would be more like a neurosis than
like epistemic responsibility for him to riddle out the costs and benefits which
might follow from forming the belief, about the costs and benefits which might
follow from assessing those costs and benefits in that way, and so on.
So it is not true that agents always ought to explicitly consider values. This
parallels a familiar point about ethical consequentialism. Even if the right action
is the one that produces the best possible outcome, actually trying to figure
out what action would produce the best possible outcome might not be the
deliberative procedure which produces the best possible outcome. The tension
is resolved by noting that consequentialism provides a standard of rightness
and that this standard is not— or at least not necessarily— a good decision
procedure for agents to employ.7
7. This is literally a textbook move; see e.g., (Shafer-Landau 2018, p. 63). Thanks to John
Milanese for pointing out this connection.
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Making a similar move, we can construe the JRD thesis as a standard of
rightness. Every belief or suspension of judgment involves trade-offs between the
risk of being wrong and the chance of being right. Believing responsibly requires
making these trade-offs in a permissible way. Sometimes thinking explicitly
about the trade-offs is the best way to believe responsibly, but the JRD thesis
is not a decision procedure. It is compatible with there being any number of
cases like those posed in the previous section.
Peter Railton (Railton 1984) characterizes this move for consequentialism as
a shift from subjective views (providing a decision procedure) to objective ones
(providing a standard of rightness). To use that language, we can see the cases
in the previous section as counter-examples to a subjective reading of the JRD
thesis. If we do not read the thesis that way, then the conflict is resolved.
Although this resolves the puzzle, it also undercuts the usual assumption
that the values reflected in belief are the personal values of scientists.
For some of the cases, the values are instead those of the community. A student or technician who follows a statistical procedure might unwittingly expose
themselves to certain risks and avail themselves of certain benefits, but there
are statisticians who have a precise understanding of those risks and benefits.
The trade-off does not reflect the student’s or technician’s values, but the tradeoff was made self-consciously by other members of the community. Moreover,
other members of the community who self-consciously reckon with trade-offs
might not be doing so with their own personal values. If the standards are
determined by a collective administrative process, then the values are the ones
arising out of the institutional context.
Alternately, there are cases in which the values are those of relevant constituencies and stake-holders. Douglas (Douglas 2009) discusses the use of
analytic-deliberative procedures to inform scientific decision making. The issue becomes political rather than narrowly ethical.
Where conventions are long-standing, the trade-offs were made by earlier
institutions or experts. These may be forgotten over time. So the persistence
of a practice carries with it past values. Per Wikman-Svahn (Wikman-Svahn
2022) gives this the helpful name value inertia.
The construction of instruments also involves considerable ingenuity and
careful considerations. So well-established, black-boxed instruments may also
exhibit value inertia.
Value inertia can expose us now to risks which, if made explicit, we would
find unacceptable. The earlier trade-offs involved in establishing conventions
or instruments— even if they were made responsibly, relative to the standards
of the time— might be different than ones we would make now. Dominant
values may have changed, or the context of use may be different. Institutions
should have resources to revisit practices and instruments when values or context
change.
Nevertheless, some value inertia is the inevitable result of having persistent
practices. Just as it would be pathological for a single person to try to make
explicit the possible costs and benefits attending to every belief, it would be
dysfunctional for an institution to constantly revisit the trade-offs involved in
8

every practice. And it would be dysfunctional for a discipline to refuse blackboxing any instrument. The black-boxing of an instrument is valuable precisely
because it allows subsequent scientists to use it without constantly revisiting
the techniques and considerations that were used in constructing it.
In other situations it may be that practices are adopted, instruments standardized, or programs published without any consideration of epistemic risks.
Institutional or market pressures might encourage doing something hastily, without due consideration, and such a precedent may be repeated and become standard. If that happens, beliefs formed may not reflect anyone’s values at all—
not the values of current scientists, nor the values of institutions, nor the values
of past actors. Even then, the JRD thesis still applies because the believers
(unwittingly) have a chance of forming a true belief and run a risk of forming
a false one. Taking on these risks willy-nilly may indicate a personal, ethical
failing on the part of the believers, but the believers will also have been failed
by their community and their institutions. Believing responsibly is not just a
private matter, but requires considering how we should conduct our epistemic
lives and construct our epistemic institutions so as to manage the inevitable
trade-offs.
To sum up: The various kinds of examples considered in section 3 show,
contra some versions of the AIR, that there are some beliefs which do not reflect
the values of the believer. The JRD thesis still holds, however, because none
of these cases escape the inevitable trade-off between the promise of knowledge
and the risk of error. This tradeoff can reflect personal values, but it need not.
It might instead reflect institutional or historical values. Or the believer might
stumble blithely into it, so that the tradeoff reflects nobody’s values at all.
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